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FAMILY LAW-Custody Dispute Between Biological
Mother and Non-biological, Non-adoptive
Party: A.C. v. C.B.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In A.C. v. C.B.,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals examined a unique
custody dispute. One party was the biological mother of the child. The
other party had no biological or adoptive relationship to the child.
However, this party was living with the biological mother before, during,
and after the child was born. Both parties were female.
This casenote outlines the decision of the court of appeals and the
issues district courts should consider when determining whether a nonbiological, non-adoptive party may seek joint custody and/or visitation
rights of a child born to her and her partner, the biological mother of
the child.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.C. and C.B., both female, lived together from 1973 until July 1,
1987. In 1980, C.B. became pregnant through artificial insemination from
an unknown donor. During the pregnancy, A.C. attended Lamaze classes
with C.B. C.B. gave birth in September of 1980. For the next seven
years, A.C. lived in the same house with C.B. and the child. 2 A.C. and
C.B. set up a trust fund for the child's education, and established a
savings account and life insurance policy for the child's benefit. 3 On July
1, 1987, A.C. and C.B. separated.
A.C. and C.B. developed a coparenting agreement 4 in 1987, before
their separation. That agreement was honored until March of 1988, when
A.C. alleged that C.B. breached the agreement by instituting harsh limitations.' A.C. claimed that C.B. severely restricted her rights to visit
and have any contact with the child. Additionally, A.C.'s offer to pay
child support was rejected. Because of the limitations on her visits, A.C.
filed a petition for joint legal custody and time sharing in October of6
1988. In November of 1988, A.C. filed a motion for immediate visitation.

1. 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 449, 827 P.2d 837 (1992).
2. The parties disputed A.C.'s participation in the "family life" of the child and C.B. Id. at
582, 829 P.2d at 661.
3. These facts were also disputed. A.C. asserted that she and C.B. jointly contributed financially
to the child's welfare. Id.
4. It is unclear whether this was an oral or written agreement and if it was limited to the
parties. Id.
5. The district court made no finding on this fact, but it could be considered true, because
C.B. did not admit nor deny this in her response to the petition. Id.
6. Id. at 582-84, 829 P.2d at 661-63.
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In March of 1989, the district judge signed a court order allowing the
"dismissal [of] this action with prejudice. ' 7 A.C. and C.B., through their
attorneys, also signed this dismissal. Further, the court order stated that
the parties had "entered into a settlement agreement providing for dismissal for this action with prejudice." 8 In August of 1989, due to C.B.'s
failure to uphold the agreement, A.C. filed a motion to reopen the
judgment of the district court or, alternatively, for enforcement of an
oral settlement agreement. 9 A.C. claimed that the oral settlement agreement, established by the parties in March of 1989, was the basis for her
willingness to dismiss the suit with prejudice.' 0
To counter the motion to reopen the judgment, C.B. filed a motion
for summary judgment. She asserted several legal defenses, including the
claim that "no legal relationship existed between the child and [A.C.]
which would confer any 'rights, privileges, duties and obligations' on the
latter. "" C.B. presented with her motion an affidavit denying the existence
of any agreement made at any time regarding the child. 12 In response
to C.B.'s summary judgment motion, A.C. maintained that there were
issues of material fact such as whether an agreement between the parties
existed and whether A.C. was a de facto parent. Attached to A.C.'s
response was a copy of C.B.'s will, which named A.C. "as guardian
and trustee of the child."' 3 The district court granted the motion for
summary judgment, citing several reasons. The court found that:
[n~o valid legal marriage exists or existed between the parties; [A.C.]
has no standing or rights that she can enforce in this matter; ...
this case [was previously dismissed] with prejudice and [A.C.] has
not met the burden under Rule 60 to re-open this case so [A.C.'s]
Motion to re-open should be denied; and because the burden has not
been met under Rule 60 to re-open the case, the Court need not
address the issue of whether or not the parties have an enforceable
existed, it was not
contract. However, if a contractual relationship
4
in the best interest of the minor child.'
The court of appeals held that the district court had jurisdiction, under
New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure 1-060(B)(3), 5 to reopen the judgment
if A.C. could demonstrate that she signed the dismissal of the court
order under fraud or misrepresentation. If A.C. was able to demonstrate

7. Id. at 582, 829 P.2d at 661; see also Order Dismissing Action with Prejudice, A.C. v.C.B.,
113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. 12335).
8. A.C., 113 N.M. at 582, 829 P.2d at 661.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 583, 829 P.2d at 662.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Slip Opinion at 1-2, A.C. v. C.B. 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. DR88-04122).
15. This rule states: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment .. . for .. .(3) fraud .. . misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party." N.M. R. Cirv. P. 1-060(B)(3).
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fraud or misrepresentation, the district court could reopen the case and
consider the merits. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district
court for a finding on the fraud issue.
The court of appeals also held that it was not possible for the district
court to determine, as a matter of law, that enforcement of the settlement
agreement was not in the best interest of the child. 16 In order to determine
what is in the best interest of the child, the district court must examine
the evidence brought before the court. 7 Finally, the court of appeals
specifically stated that A.C.'s "sexual orientation, standing alone, is 8not
a permissible basis for the denial of shared custody or visitation."'
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Historical Treatment of Custody
Prior to the seventeenth century in England, the feudal concept of a
child as property, or chattels, was the norm. 19 Parents had absolute power
over their children. Because of this perspective no one, not even the
court, had standing to intervene in the parent-child relationship. Over
time, the courts, assuming the responsibility of protecting those subjects
it determined were unable to protect themselves, employed the theory of
parens patriae. 20 From this the courts gained standing to intervene in the
parent-child relationship. Historically, courts have limited each child to
exactly one male parent and one female parent. 21 In New Mexico this
idea has been altered to include other persons in the child's life. The
New Mexico courts have recognized that children may have many people
who act as parents. 22
This case presented to the New Mexico courts for the first time the
threshold issues of whether a non-biological, non-adoptive party has
standing to seek joint custody and visitation rights, and whether the nonbiological, non-adoptive party must show that the biological mother is
unfit to obtain those rights. The court of appeals did not directly address
the issue of whether A.C. has standing as a "parent" to seek joint
A.

16. A.C., 113 N.M. at 585, 829 P.2d at 664; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(1) (Repl. Pamp.
1989).
17. A.C., 113 N.M. at 585, 829 P.2d at 664.
18. Id.
19. Sandra R. Blair, Note, Jurisdiction, Standing, and DecisionalStandards in Parent-Nonparent
Custody Disputes-In re Marriage of Allen, 28 WN.APP. 637, 622 P.2d 16 (1981), 58 WASH. L.
REV. 111, 112 n.12 (1982).
20. Literally this means "parent of the country." The theory originated from the English common
law, where the King had a royal prerogative to act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities,
such as infants. In the United States, this function belongs with the states. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
1114 (6th ed. 1990).
21. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other NontraditionalFamilies, 78 GEO. L.J. 459
(1990) [hereinafter Polikoff].
22. Not only through case law have these relationships been recognized, but also by statute.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-9-1 and 40-9-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
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custody. Similarly, the court of appeals did not offer any guidance on
the issue of whether the non-biological, non-adoptive party must show
that the biological mother is an unfit parent to be able to establish her
own rights of custody or visitation.
Who is a Parent?
Under section 40-4-9.1(L)(4) of the New Mexico statutes, 23 the term
parent has several meanings; "'parent' means a natural parent, adoptive
parent or person who is acting as a parent who has or shares legal
' 24
custody of a child or who claims a right to have or share legal custody."
This broad definition suggests limitless possibilities of who might qualify
as a parent, seemingly including someone in the position of appellant,
A.C.. However, it is the implicit desire of some courts to prevent third
parties from pursuing custody simply because of some feeling of affection
for that child. 25 On the other hand, some courts have broadened the
definition of a parent. There are three doctrines that have been employed
by the courts to determine who is a parent: (1)26 in loco parentis; (2)
equitable estoppel; and (3) equitable parenthood.
B.

1. In Loco Parentis
New Mexico has expressed the doctrine of in loco parentis in a particular
manner. It states that:
[a] person is said to stand in loco parentis when he puts himself in
the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident
to the parental relationship without going through the formalities
must intend to
necessary to a legal adoption. However, the person
7
assume toward the child the status of a parent. 2
This doctrine was first articulated in Spells v. Spells. 28 In Spells the
Pennsylvania trial court refused to grant visitation rights to a stepparent.
The appellate court reversed this decision and remanded the case for a
hearing to determine if the stepparent stood in loco parentis to the child.
The appellate court was persuaded that the step-parent-child relationship
was analogous to the biological parent-child relationship. The court explained that "it is against public policy to limit or destroy the relationship
of parent to child . . . .Accordingly, when a step-parent stands 'in loco
his stepchildren, courts must jealously guard his rights to
parentis' with
29
visitation.'
In Carter v. Broderick,30 the court conducted a similar examination of
the in loco parentis doctrine. Here a step-parent was seeking visitation

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(L)(4) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
Id.
See Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 n.5 (Alaska 1982).
Polikoff, supra note 22, at 470.
Fevig v. Fevig, 90 N.M. 51, 53, 559 P.2d 839, 841 (1977).
378 A.2d 879 (1977).
Id. at 883.
644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982).
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rights under a statute that allowed custody or visitation with "any child
of the marriage."'" The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the common law
doctrine as stated in Spells and then expanded it through a discussion
of "psychological parentage." According to the court a psychological
parent is described as:
one who, on a day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship,
interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological need for an
adult. This adult becomes an essential focus of the child's life, for
he is not only the source of the fulfillment of the child's physical
needs, but also the source of his emotional and psychological needs
.... This relationship may exist between a child and any adult; it
depends not upon the category into which the adult falls-biological,
adoptive, foster, or32common-law-but upon the quality and mutuality
of the interaction.

Two factors seemed to provide A.C. with the standing to seek joint
custody. First, the doctrine of in loco parentis fits with New Mexico's
statutory definition of parent, especially "[a] person who is acting as a
parent who has or shares legal custody of a child . . . ,,33 Second, it is
impossible for New Mexico courts to determine, as a matter of law,
whether a person is in loco parentis because the doctrine mandates a
factual determination. The guiding principle is a concern with preserving
the parent-child relationship. To that end, the court must do all within
its power to determine where those relationships exist, formal or not,
and then it must enact court orders to keep them intact.
A.C. alleged that she participated in the child's life as a co-parent,
supporting him financially and emotionally. 4 A.C. also provided a copy
of C.B.'s will, naming A.C. as trustee and guardian of C.B.'s estate
and her child.35 With this evidence before it, the district court should
have taken the time to explore the nature of A.C.'s relationship to the
child. Here it seems the court did not want to engage in the sometimes
difficult and awkward task of identifying all the parent-child relationships
that may truly exist.
An example of the seeming hesitation to recognize non-biological relationships is In re Melvin B. ,36 where a stepmother moved to intervene
in a periodic hearing. The stepmother was briefly married to the father
of Melvin B. When the father disappeared, he left the child with the
stepmother. The child was removed from the foster home where he had
lived before living with his father and stepmother. The stepmother, in
her motion to intervene, stated that she had developed a strong bond
with the child. The court of appeals was not satisfied that the stepmother

31. Id. at 855 (citing Alaska Stat. § 09.55.205 (1977)).
32. Id. at 853 (citing Gruengerg & Mackey, A New Direction for Child Custody in Alaska, 6
U.C.L.A.-AIASKA L. REv. 34, 36 (1976)).
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(L)(4) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
34. Petitioner's Answer to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at RP 52, A.C. v.
C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. 12335).
35. Id. Exhibit "B", at RP 64.
36. 109 N.M. 18, 780 P.2d 1165 (Ct. App. 1989).
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was a custodian of the child under the statute.3 7 Further, the court of
appeals found that even if the stepmother was "a person in loco parentis,"
it could find no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion. 38 The
court was willing to overlook an important and perhaps meaningful
relationship to this young child whose father had abandoned him. The
court disregarded the parent-child relationship possibly because it was
not based on biology and because it was not easily determinable.
The court's hesitation to recognize non-biological parent-child relationships is particularly interesting in light of the responsibilities of a
parent to support a child after dissolution of marriage. This responsibility
continues even though the child may not be the biological or adoptive
child of the parent.
2. Equitable Estoppel
The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been used to establish the
responsibilities of family members as well as to establish their corresponding rights. The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) representation
through acts or conduct; (2) reliance on the assertions of the acts or
conduct; and (3) a detriment suffered as a result of the reliance on the
representation. 3 9 New Mexico courts have applied the principles of equitable estoppel to cases determining the responsibilities of biologicallyrelated family members, 4° but not to cases concerning nontraditional
families. Other jurisdictions have used it widely to enforce obligations
of biological and nonbiological parents. 4' In M.H.B. v. H.T.B.,42 a New
Jersey court held that the obligations of a divorced stepparent are equitably
estopped from denying an earlier commitment to support his stepchild
financially. The facts showed that the stepfather had successfully gained
the child's love and established himself as the little girl's parental provider
of emotional and material support. 4 3 The court held that under these
circumstances the stepfather wai obligated to continue supporting his
stepchild. 44
Applying these facts to the elements of estoppel, it is clear how the
court arrived at its holding. The conduct of the stepfather represented
to the child the intention of the stepfather to provide financial and
emotional support to the child-he assumed the status of a parent to
this child. The child relied on this support and, when the divorce occurred
and the stepfather discontinued financial support, she suffered a detriment.
Similarly, A.C. alleged she conducted herself as a coparent to the
child. 45 She accepted the financial responsibility for the child and offered

37. Id.
38. Id. at 19-20, 780 P.2d at 1166-67.
39. Matter of Estates of Salas, 105 N.M. 472, 474, 734 P.2d 250, 252 (Ct. App. 1987).
40. See Brannock v. Brannock, 104 N.M. 385, 772 P.2d 636 (1986).
41. See Berrisford v. Berrisford, 322 N.W.2d 742 (Minn. 1982); M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 498 A.2d
775 (N.J. 1985); Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).
42. 498 A.2d 775 (N.J. 1985).
43. Id. at 780.
44. Id.
45. Petitioner's Answer to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at RP 52, A.C. v.
C.B,, 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. 12335).
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to continue that support after she and C.B. dissolved their relationship."
If the court could find that C.B. brought an action under the doctrine
of equitable estoppel, her chances of success were good, as A.C.'s failure
to continue financial support was a detriment to the child. Similarly,
C.B.'s failure to allow continued emotional support can be seen as a
detriment to the child.
3. Equitable Parenthood
Finally, courts have developed the doctrine of "equitable parenthood"
to preserve a parent-child relationship. Equitable parenthood was created
to allow a non-biological parent, who treated the child as his own, to
custody and visitation rights.4 7 In Atkinson v. Atkinson, the former
husband was denied visitation rights by the mother of a four-year-old
child because he was not the biological father of the child. The court
held that, even though "the husband is not the biological father of a
child born during the marriage, the husband may acquire rights of
paternity under the theory of 'equitable parent' and the analogous doctrine
of 'equitable adoption." ' 4 The court came to this determination based
on the idea that if the husband acted as if the child was his own, and
wanted to continue to assume the status of father of the child 4after
a
nonpaternity was established, then he should be allowed to do so.
The doctrine of equitable parenthood follows from the application of
equitable estoppel in divorce cases. As stated in the earlier section, that
doctrine does not permit a parent to deny paternity to escape the responsibility of the support of the child when she/he has assumed the
status of parent.50 When a party has related to a child as if it were her/
his own, the courts are going to require that party to live up to her/
his financial responsibilities to that child. It would neither be logical nor
fair to deny that same party the right of custody or visitation. This is
the sort of factual examination necessary to determine the actual parental
status of A.C. If there is evidence that she assumed the status of mother
-to the child, then, given this doctrine, she should be able to enjoy the
rights that flow from her position as "equitable parent."
C. Best Interest of the Child
The issue that drives custody and visitation determinations is the best
interest of the child. Under both the statutory 5' and case law5 2 of New

46. Id.
47. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 517 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 520.
50. See id.
51. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-4-7, -9.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
52. See Lopez v. Lopez, 97 N.M. 332, 639 P.2d 1186 (1981); Schuermann v. Schuermann, 94
N.M. 81, 607 P.2d 619 (1980); Stone v. Stone, 79 N.M. 351, 443 P.2d 741 (1968); Kotrola v.
Kotrola, 79 N.M. 258, 442 P.2d 570 (1968); Fox v. Doak, 78 N.M. 743, 438 P.2d 153 (1968);
Tuttle v. Tuttle, 66 N.M. 134, 343 P.2d 838 (1959).
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Mexico, the trial court's controlling inquiry, when settling a custody
dispute, is the best interest of the child.53 In Lopez v. Lopez, the New
Mexico Supreme Court clearly spelled out the priority of the trial court.
It said that "[tihe trial court must keep in mind that it is the well-being
a parent that ought
of the child rather than the reward or punishment ' of
54
to guide the trial court in determining visitation.
Studies of the psychological development of children indicate that an
issue of primary importance to children's well-being is that they feel
loved and cared for by their parents.55 The separation from a person
who has assumed the status of parent in5 6a child's eyes could harm the
child's feeling of well-being and security.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals clearly stated in A.C. v. C.B. that
the district court erred when it determined that enforcement of the
settlement agreement was not in the best interest of the child. Two factors
make the district court's decision questionable. First, the district court
made its decision "as a matter of law." ' 57 In In re Jacinta M., 5 the
court of appeals asserted that "[fjindings of a trier of fact must be
supported by the evidence presented." 5 9 Nothing in the decision indicates
that the district court adhered to the requirement of Jacinta M. It is a
contradiction to make a decision as a matter of law and to consider
evidence presented.60 Second, it appears that the district court based its
decision on the sexual orientation of the parties. In New Mexico, sexual
orientation has been held not to be an adequate basis for denying custody
or visitation. 6' The New Mexico custody statutes 62 provide factors of
consideration to determine what is in the best interest of the child. These
factors are given as a guide to those matters that are necessary to promote
the best interest of the child.
Under the New Mexico custody statute 63 the relationship of the child
and A.C. should have been considered among other factors before the
district court could award custody. This statute specifically states that
"[tihe court shall consider all relevant factors including, but not limited
to: . . (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
parents ....
and any other person who may significantly affect the child's

53. See, e.g., Schuermann, 94 N.M. at 83, 607 P.2d at 621.
54. 97 N.M. at 335, 639 P.2d at 1189.
55. Polikoff, supra note 21.
56. Id.
57. A.C., 113 N.M. at 584, 829 P.2d at 663.
58. 107 N.M. 769, 764 P.2d 1327 (Ct. App. 1988).
59. Id. at 771, 764 P.2d at 1329 (citing Fitzsimmons v. Fitzsimmons, 104 N.M. 420, 722 P.2d
671 (Ct. App. 1986)).
60. However, it is important to note that the district court could not have enforced the settlement
agreement because it was not a court-approved settlement or a consent decree. See N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 1-060 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
61. See In re Jacinta M., 107 N.M. 769, 764 P.2d 1327 (Ct. App. 1988).
62. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-4-9, -9.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
63. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9(A)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
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best interest." It seems there is no plainer statement of the importance
of non-biological, non-adoptive relationships than this statutory language.
D. Unfitness of a Parent
The best interest of the child standard requires a showing of the unfitness
of one or both parents to terminate parental rights. The New Mexico
Domestic Affairs Code states: "[wihen any person other than a natural
or adoptive parent seeks custody of a child, no such person shall be
awarded custody absent a showing of unfitness of the natural or adoptive
parent." 65 A higher standard is placed upon the non-parent third party.
The third party must not only show it is in the best interest of the child
to be out of the custody of the parent, but must also show that the
parent is unfit as a parent." Similarly, if one parent is seeking to terminate
the joint custody award, then the parent seeking the change assumes the
burden and must overcome the presumption that the original award of
joint custody was reasonable. 67 If the court is asked to terminate the
rights of a parent there should be a heavier burden placed on the party
seeking termination, but if the inquiry of the court is only to maintain,
or to award, joint custody the burden to the party wanting joint custody
should be lighter.
A.C. had no need to show that C.B., the biological mother, was unfit
to obtain joint custody. The district court misinterpreted the "parental
right doctrine"6" to decide that A.C. lacked standing to secure joint
custody. The district court ignored the statutory definition of parent, 69
and the other parental status doctrines discussed above. Thus, the district
court declared de facto that A.C. was an unfit parent. A.C. did not
want to extinguish C.B.'s parental rights, but only to join in those rights
as another parent. Here the district court should have placed the burden
on C.B. to prove that A.C. was an unfit parent because C.B. wanted
to terminate A.C.'s parental rights. Because joint custody by the parents
is presumed to be in the best interest of the child, 70 then the district
court should have recognized A.C.'s standing as a parent, per the definition, and should have analyzed the facts to determine whether this
arrangement would be in the best interest of the child.
Essentially, a district court must analyze the evidence and decide that
the facts prove that joint custody should be terminated because it does

64. Id.
65. N.M.

STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(K) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
66. RUTHANN RoBsoN, LESBIAN (OUT) LAW SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 132 (1992).

67. Jeantete v. Jeantete, IIl N.M. 417, 806 P.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1990).
68. The "parental right doctrine" is defined as:
[a] parent who is able to care for his children and desires to do so, and who has
not been found to be an unfit person to have their custody in an action or
proceeding where that question is in issue, is entitled to custody as against grandparents or others who have no permanent or legal right to custody.
Shorty v. Scott, 87 N.M. 490, 492 n.1, 535 P.2d 1341, 1343 n.1 (1975) (citations omitted).
69. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(L)(4) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
70. Id. § 40-4-9.1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
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not benefit the child. To terminate joint custody, evidence that "visitation
interferes with the child's emotional well-being or significantly disrupts
the child's day to day environment, [and] should []be limited," must
be presented.7' The fact that a child's "day to day environment" consists
of two female parents and no male parent cannot
be reason enough to
72
decide one female parent, or both, is unfit.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In New Mexico the welfare of the child is the controlling consideration
in custody proceedings. 7 However, in cases such as this one, where a
non-traditional family is part of the dispute, the court usually defers to
the allocation of one parent of each gender. It is often very difficult
for the courts, and the state, to recognize that this ideology comes from
the same
prejudicial ideologies that fueled antimiscegenation laws of years
74
past.
The district court erred on several points and must consider them in
its future analysis. The court cannot determine as a matter of law whether
a proposed custody arrangement is in the best interest of the child. The
legislature established specific guidelines for the court because, most likely,
the legislature recognizes the importance of various non-traditional relationships.
Although it may be a difficult issue to address directly, someday the
courts of New Mexico will be forced to address the ultimate question
presented here. The courts will have to determine whether both "parents"
in a lesbian or gay-male relationship have the same parental rights as
those given to parents in heterosexual non-biological, non-adoptive relationships. The difficulty with this issue does not necessarily flow from
the lesbian or gay-male relationship versus the heterosexual relationship.
The difficulty, most likely, flows from the factual inquiry this determination requires. The court will need to examine at a minimum three
factors. First, the court must find that the non-biological parent has a
relationship with the child. Second, it must conclude that the relationship
rises to the level of parent-child. Finally, the court must find that
continuation of the relationship is in the best interest of the child. As
one commentator has stated, "[tihe court's role is neither to embrace
the creation of a nontraditional family nor to punish the parents for
failing to adhere to the one-mother/one-father family
form. Rather, the
' 75
court's role is to serve the child's best interest.
S. ELIZABETH MOORE

71. Lopez v. Lopez, 97 N.M. 332, 335, 639 P.2d 1186, 1189 (1981).
72. See generally Polikoff, supra note 21.
73. See Schuermann v. Schuermann, 94 N.M. 81, 607 P.2d 619 (1980); Roberts v. Staples, 79
N.M. 298, 442 P.2d 788 (1968); Kotrola v. Kotrola, 79 N.M. 258, 442 P.2d 570 (1968); Stone v.
Stone, 79 N.M. 351, 443 P.2d 741 (1968).
74. Polikoff, supra note 21.
75. Id. at 543.

